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Blood is not always thicker than water: The limited effect of 
kin selection on human kinship in the traditional Chinese 
family 
Lixing Sun* 
Department of Biological Sciences, Central Washington University, Ellensburg, Washington 98926-7537, USA 
Abstract  To examine the importance of kin selection in shaping human societies, this study analyzed the kinship system prac-
ticed in traditional China for two millennia and teased apart its underlying genetic and other, presumably cultural, components. 
The results demonstrate that, in the traditional patrilineal Chinese family, both genetic relatedness and the cultural factor of ge-    
neration were important in determining kinship status for male agnates (genetically related relatives). For female agnates, how-
ever, only genetic relatedness was important. Another surprising finding was that the influence of gender was not as important as 
genetic relatedness. The most interesting finding in this study, however, was that kin selection and culture (i.e., seniority in gen-
eration and age) played vastly different roles in different lineages in the Chinese family: for collateral (indirect) agnates, genetic 
relatedness was the most important factor in determining their kinship status, but for lineal (direct) agnates, its importance was 
overridden by seniority in generation and age, a cultural factor. Several other bio-cultural factors also explained a considerable 
amount of variance in kinship status. Since kinship profoundly affected, and was often the foundation of, the legal and social sys-
tems in dynastic China, kin selection, while its strength may differ remarkably between lineal and collateral relatives, could act as 
a selective force in Chinese families  [Current Zoology 56 (2): 182–189, 2010]. 
Key words  Kinship, Kin selection, Genetic relatedness, Chinese family, Culture 
Kin selection may be the most important conceptual 
development in our evolutionary thinking since Dar-
win’s idea of natural selection. It is considered a foun-    
ding principle of sociobiology (Wilson, 1975), which 
has inspired the emergence of behavioral ecology, evo-
lutionary anthropology, and evolutionary psychology. 
For three decades, kin selection has been viewed as 
central to the study of social behavior and social evolu-
tion (e.g., Frank, 1998). The idea of kin selection 
broadens traditional Darwinian fitness by adding indi-
rect fitness (the additive reproductive success of an or-
ganism’s relatives weighted by their genetic relatedness 
to the organism) to direct fitness (the organism’s own 
reproductive success) in evolutionary analysis. The two 
components are lumped together and collectively called 
inclusive fitness. Selection, accordingly, favors indi-
viduals that can maximize their inclusive fitness 
(Hamilton, 1964). For this reason, kin selection is fre-
quently invoked as an ultimate cause for observed altru-
istic behavior. It explains why animals exhibit altruism, 
even to the degree that they would sacrifice their own 
lives for their close relatives. 
Recent findings in animal cooperation, however, 
have cast doubts on the assumed ubiquity and overall 
importance of kin selection (e.g., Grinnell et al., 1995; 
Goldberg and Wrangham, 1997; Mitani et al., 2000; 
Moller and Beheregaray, 2001; Clutton-Brock, 2002; 
Griffin and West, 2002; Wilson, 2005; Wilson and 
Hölldobler, 2005). Compelling evidence has surfaced to 
indicate that the strength of kin selection varies among 
species (Griffin and West, 2003), confirming the theo-
retical insight that the evolutionary process can be 
highly complex when other factors are involved in kin 
selection (e.g., Tylor and Frank, 1996; Frank, 1998). 
These new discoveries conjure up the unsettled issues 
that have been hotly debated for decades: can kin selec-
tion be applied to human society and, if yes, how effec-
tive does it work under the overwhelming influence of 
human culture? Clearly, close empirical examinations 
on the efficacy of kin selection in human social evolu-
tion are both urgent and necessary to resolve these im-
portant issues. Yet, few empirical studies are currently 
available to quantitatively assess the strength of kin se-
lection in humans. 
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Although the evidence of differential treatment fa-
voring kin versus non-kin or close kin versus distant kin 
has been profusely documented in a large variety of 
animals (e.g., Fletcher and Michener, 1987; Hepper, 
1991), it nevertheless cannot be used to support the ar-
gument that animals, including humans, are selected to 
maximize inclusive fitness. This is because Hamilton’s 
model assumes that the genetic effect is additive and 
fitness is a linear function of genetic relatedness (Ham-
ilton, 1964), as expressed by the formula inc i if f r  , 
where finc is the inclusive fitness of the focal individual 
and fi is the fitness of kin i who is related to the focal 
individual by the genetic coefficient ri. Therefore, 
maximization of inclusive fitness via Hamiltonian kin 
selection has yet to meet two more stringent conditions. 
First, recognized kinship should have a strong, positive, 
linear correlation with genetic relatedness, as shown in 
the formula. Second, the distribution of altruism is 
scaled proportionally (or nearly so) to genetic related-
ness, which is reliably mapped by kinship, for recipients 
of equal conditions under an ideal situation. Deviations 
from either of these two conditions would necessarily 
weaken the strength of kin selection and, at the same 
time, signify the involvement of other factors. Unfortu-
nately, to my best knowledge, no such empirical data 
are currently available and little effort has been made to 
separate the importance of kin selection from those of 
other compounding factors. 
For humans, kinship is a social interpretation of as-
sumed genetic relatedness. Researchers have for long 
been aware of the overlap and difference between kin-
ship used in practice and genetic relatedness in theory in 
a broad context (e.g., Gellner, 1960; Schneider, 1984; 
Holy, 1996; Stone, 2001). Yet, whether or not kin selec-
tion can be applied to human societies and how much 
influence culture exerts on human kinship are yet to be 
answered. Thus, quantitative analyses on the relation-
ship between kinship and genetic relatedness become 
pivotal in providing key insights into these critical 
issues. 
Fortunately, Chinese civilization, meticulously re-
corded for over two millennia, offers a distinctive op-
portunity for assessing how kinship was determined and 
how it was related to kin selection in human society. 
The fundamental and predominant social organization 
unit in dynastic China was the kin-based patrilineal, 
patrilocal family (Goody, 1990). This pattern of family 
organization appeared to be an adaptation to intense 
collective competition under little regulated social, 
economic, and political conditions (Sun, 2010). As a 
result of this family-based competition, large families 
were economically richer and politically more powerful 
than small families. This pattern of competition also 
compelled patrilineal relatives to stay together. Conse-
quently, families or clans of tens, hundreds, or even 
thousands of members frequently resided together, often 
with undivided common assets (Yang, 2000). Since po-
lygyny was legal throughout this long period, wealth 
(often related to power and social prestige) became the 
major factor for men to have numerous women as wives 
and concubines and, in at least some dynasties, the rela-
tionship between the number of concubines a man could 
have was approximately related to his wealth (Wang, 
2001). Hence, personal wealth, to a certain degree, pre-
dicted a person’s direct fitness, in addition to its com-
plex, but probably unknowable, effect on his indirect 
fitness. Since personal wealth was mostly acquired 
through kin-based inheritance or asset allocation and 
was critical for reproductive success, especially for men 
(Goody, 1990), kinship status certainly had a profound 
effect on a person’s inclusive fitness in traditional 
China. 
I here present an indirect way to assess the magnitude 
of kin selection using historical data from dynastic 
China. To do so, I started with the null hypothesis that 
the Chinese kinship system was based on kin selection 
alone. This hypothesis predicts that kinship correlated 
perfectly (or nearly so) with genetic relatedness. This is 
based on the logic that if kinship and genetic relatedness 
has no relationship, kin selection will cease to work (see 
the first prerequisite for kin selection three paragraphs 
back). By testing the prediction, I attempted to answer 
two questions: How was kinship related to genetic re-
latedness and how was the powerful selection force of 
Chinese criminal law related to the kinship system. The 
focus of my approach is to tease apart the roles of ge-
netic and cultural factors in constructing the Chinese 
kinship system. 
1  Materials and Methods 
I define kinship as a social system or institution by 
which genetic relatedness is somehow recognized based 
on a set of common rules or conventions used by people 
in a society. Such societal kin recognition may differ 
from individual kin recognition, which is exercised by 
each and every member in society. Therefore, a societal 
kinship system, as a social norm, convention, or institu-
tion, is normally more stable than individual kin recog-
nition, which may vary greatly among individuals under 
a variety of contexts (Feng, 1948). (To avoid any possi-
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ble confusion, the words “kinship,” “kinship system,” 
“kinship status,” and “kinship rank” in this article refer 
to culturally normative kinship.) Under this operational 
definition of kinship, the Chinese had a broadly prac-
ticed kinship system that was legally supported for two 
millennia from the Han (206 B.C. – A.D. 220) to the 
Qing dynasties (1644 – 1911). This system classified 
agnatic (by birth) and affinal (by marriage) relatives into 
six kin ranks [from high to low: zhuanshuai (斩衰), 
qishuai (齐衰), qinian (期年), dagong (大功), xiaogong 
(小功), and sima (缌麻)], each having a specific set of 
benefits, rights, and duties, such as inheritance, wealth 
and asset division, and filial and mourning obligations 
(Ebrey and Watson, 1986). 
The Chinese define family in a way markedly diffe- 
rent from the West. “Family” in China can refer to nu-
clear family, extended family, or clan. A clan is also 
called a “grand family” or zongzu (宗族) in Chinese, 
often with the genealogical relationships among clan 
members clearly or even completely recorded in great 
detail for many generations. Such broadly defined fami-
lies have been common in many Asian and African 
countries, and some part of Europe such as southern 
Italy. To comply with this Chinese conception and for 
the ease of discussion, I here use the word “family” as a 
broadly defined concept unless specified. Also, tradi-
tional Chinese families were virtually always kin-
ship-based, but depart markedly from Hamiltonian kin-
ship. Metaphorical kin were excluded in a strict sense. 
So a family, even a large clan, was composed of either 
agnates (consanguineal relatives) or affines. Such clear 
dichotomy of family membership greatly facilitated 
analysis (see below). Additionally, in plural families 
where concubines were involved, all relatives of the 
concubines, including their parents and their children 
were excluded, by law, from the families they were 
“married” into (they were actually bought) because their 
low social status, for which their genetic lineages did 
not “deserve” to be included in their husbands’ families 
(Wang, 2001). Therefore, polygyny did not complicate 
the analysis of the kinship system. 
I constructed the Chinese kinship system from the 
Han to the Qing dynasties based on historical docu-
ments (Xu, 1933; Shi, 1999). To investigate the strength 
of kin selection, I focused my analysis on agnates of the 
ego (self: the person served as the reference in the cen-
ter of the kinship system) in the same family (Fig. 1) 
because they were genetically related and male agnates 
mostly spent their entire lives in the family. For female 
agnates, I used their kin ranks before they married out to 
avoid the complication and redundancy caused by the 
change in kinship status after marriage [A woman’s 
kinship status was lowered by precisely one rank after 
marrying out and redefined in her new marital families 
(Shi, 1999)]. Since the Han dynasty, marriages between 
relatives had been generally avoided and marriages be-
tween people with the same surnames are stiffly tabooed 
(Dull, 1978), I thus simplified the analysis by assuming 
that all women married out and no marriage happened 
within the lineage shown in Fig. 1. Uxorilocal marriages, 
where men married into women’s households, were rare 
in especially Northern China and, when they did occur, 
they were seen primarily in poor and small families 
(Goody, 1990). 
 
Fig. 1  The kinship system in dynastic China, showing only 
agnatic relatives of the male ego (white square) 
All male (square) and female (circle) members with the same kinship 
status in reference to the ego in the lineage are represented by a single 
symbol. Male and female agnates were symmetrical so as to be unbi-
ased for analysis. The numbers at the left are the number of genera-
tions up and down from the ego, depending on the ego’s age. 
 
I calculated the coefficient of relatedness (r) as the 
genetic relatedness (Hamilton, 1964) between the ego 
and every other member of the family (Fig. 1) using 
path analysis (Crow and Kimura, 1970). Then, I used 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rs) to investi-
gate how kinship (kin rank, as shown in Fig. 1) was 
related to genetic relatedness and seniority in genera-
tion. The results were corroborated by using Kendall’s 
partial correlation analysis (Gibbons, 1993) through 
simultaneously considering the influences of genetic 
relatedness and generation on kinship rank. Note that 
rs here is a measure of similarity between what it was 
in reality and what it would be expected based on the 
hypothesis if kin selection alone was at work. So, in a 
sense, it is not a usual statistical application of correla-
tional analysis. 
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The importance of the genetic and cultural factors in 
determining a person’s kinship rank was estimated using 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, which, when 
squared, produces the proportion of the variance ex-
plained by each factor, provided there is no significant 
interaction between genetic relatedness and generation. 
(This assumption turned out to be true, indeed, after 
analysis). This method of estimation, being a 
non-parametric alternative to ANOVA, is approximate 
nevertheless, as it is based on ordinal, rather than ratio, 
data. 
Finally, I related the Chinese kinship system to kin 
selection by a case study to illustrate how the kin-based 
dynastic Chinese criminal law took inclusive fitness into 
consideration. Specifically, I chose the penalty for the 
common crime, hitting people (battery in legal terms), 
to probe the role of kinship in the criminal justice sys-
tem based mainly on the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618 – 917) 
(Shi, 1999). In traditional China, the legal definition of 
battery included a large variety of physical violence, 
ranging from battery to aggravated assault in today’s 
EuroAmerican legal systems. Although there were 
variations in severity and form, criminals were punished 
in a remarkably similar way according to the same kin-
ship system in other dynasties. The trial and sentencing 
were proceeded by the government (Yamen 衙门 ), 
mostly at the county level. So usually, no kinsmen were 
involved for either the criminals or the victims. Spear-
man’s rank correlation was used to examine the correla-
tion between kinship and severity of punishment. The 
level of significance for all tests was set at 0.05 a priori.  
2  Results 
For male agnates, kinship was positively correlated 
with genetic relatedness (rs = 1, n = 3, P < 0.001 for 
generation +2; rs = 0.949, n = 4, P = 0.051 for genera-
tions +1 and 0; rs = 0.894, n = 4, P = 0.106; rs = 1, n = 3, 
P < 0.001 for generation -2, see Fig. 1). The influence 
of generation, traditionally viewed as the most impor-
tant cultural factor in Chinese social life (Watson, 1986), 
was indeed substantial with elder relatives defined as 
closer kin than younger relatives for the same level of 
genetic relatedness (rs = 0.0949, n = 4, P = 0.051 for r 
= 1/4; rs = 0.975, n = 5, P =0.005, for r = 1/8; rs = 
0.655, n = 6, P =0.158, for r = 1/16). For female ag-
nates, kinship was also positively correlated with ge-
netic relatedness (rs = 1.000, n = 3, P < 0.001 for gen-
eration +2; rs = 0.949; n = 4, P =0.051 for generations 
+1 and 0; rs=0.894, n = 4, P = 0.051 for generation -1; rs 
= 1, n = 3, P < 0.001 for generation 2). The influence 
of generation, however, was insignificant (rs = -0.866, n 
= 3, P = 0.333 for r = 1/2; rs = 0.949, n = 4, P =0.051 
for r = 1/4; rs = .821, n = 5, P = 0.089 for r = 1/8; rs = 
-0.655, n = 6, P = 0.158 for r = 1/16). 
When genetic relatedness and generation were con-
sidered simultaneously using Kendall’s partial correla-
tion analysis, kinship was positively correlated with 
genetic relatedness (τ =0.307, P < 0.050) but not with 
generation (τ = -0.168, P > 0.200) for all male agnates. 
For lineal male agnates, relatedness still had some in-
fluence (τ = 0.377, P > 0.270), but generation also 
played a considerable role (τ = 0.252, P > 0.500), 
though neither was significant, perhaps due to the con-
straint of the small sample size. Kinship for collateral 
(indirect) male agnates was positively correlated with 
genetic relatedness (τ = 0.570, P < 0.005), but generation 
had virtually no influence (τ =0.000, P = 1.000). For all 
agnates or collateral female agnates, kinship was posi-
tively correlated with genetic relatedness (τ = 0.547, P 
<0.010 for all agnates; τ = 0.570, P <0.010 for collateral 
agnates), but not with generation (τ = 0.161, P > 0.200 
for all agnates; τ = 0.000, P = 1.000 for collateral ag-
nates). For female lineal agnates, neither factor was sig-
nificant (τ =0.377, P > 0.178 for genetic relatedness; τ = 
0.252, P > 0.400 for generation). 
Since generation and genetic relatedness were not 
correlated conceptually or statistically (τ = 0.000–0.290, 
P = 0.400 – 1.000), Spearman’s rank correlation coeffi-
cient could be used to separately estimate the impor-
tance of genetic relatedness and generation in determi-   
ning kinship status, in terms of how much variance in 
kinship rank is explained. While genetic relatedness was 
important in kinship in general, especially for collateral 
relatives, the culturally imposed generation factor had a 
higher influence in determining the closeness among 
lineal relatives (Table 1). 
Dynastic Chinese criminal laws were strongly influ-
enced by two factors: seniority in generation and age, 
and kinship between the criminal and the victim. Hitting 
people could incur harsh penalty, which was weighed 
according to kinship rank and seniority in generation 
and age. For battery between two agnates, the closer the 
kinship between the offender and the victim, the more 
severe the punishment if the offender was the younger 
one (rs = 0.937, n = 6, P =0.002) and the lighter the 
punishment if the offender was the elder one (rs = 0.972, 
P <0.001). The discrepancy in penalty scale between 
elder and younger offenders was reduced as their kin-
ship rank became increasingly lower (rs = 0.937, P = 
0.002, Fig. 2). 
186 Current Zoology Vol. 56  No. 2 
 
Table 1  Influences of genetic relatedness, generation, and other bio-cultural factors on the Chinese kinship system 
Gender Kin Correlation coefficient (rs) a Kinship variance accounted for (rs2 × 100%) b 
  Relatedness Generation Relatedness Generation Other 
Male Lineal (n = 8) 0.377 0.822* 14.21 67.57 18.22 
 Collateral (n = 16) 0.874** 0.031 76.39 0.10 23.51 
 Combined (n = 24) 0.781** 0.398 61.00 15.84 23.16 
Female Lineal (n = 8) 0.377 0.822* 14.21 67.57 18.22 
 Collateral (n = 16) 0.874** 0.000 76.39 0.00 23.61 
 Combined (n = 24) 0.782** 0.380 61.15 14.44 24.41 
Combined Lineal (n = 16) 0.377 0.822** 14.21 67.57 18.22 
 Collateral (n = 32) 0.874** 0.016 76.39 0.02 23.59 
  Combined (n = 48) 0.781** 0.389** 61.00 15.13 23.87 
a * P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01; rs is Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, calculated similarly as the Pearson product-moment correlation coeffi-
cient using ranks in MINITAB. 
b Because no significant correlation was found between genetic relatedness and generation in any of the analyses, their respective contributions 
to kinship were separable. 
 
 
Fig. 2  Punishment for the crime of battery based on senio- 
rity in generation and age, and kinship between the offender 
and the victim 
 
The vertical axis shows the 20 major penalty scales with increasing 
severity (0, not guilty; 1–5, whipping; 6–10, clubbing; 11–15, jailing; 
16–18, exiling; 19, hanging; and 20, decapitation). The precise penalty 
scales are shown above the bars. The horizontal axis represents kin-
ship rank (simplified as “R”) from the highest (1) to the lowest (6). 
Kinship ranks (without parentheses) and generation numbers (inside 
parentheses) are the same as those in Fig. 1. “0+” indicates an elder 
member of the same generation, and “≥+1” indicates a member sen-
ior by at least one generation. Black bars show the penalty for the 
younger or junior hitting the elder or senior, whereas white bars indi-
cate the penalty for the elder or senior hitting the younger or junior. 
 
3  Discussion 
The Chinese kinship system was legally instituted in 
all dynasties from the Han to the Qing as a response to 
the long-existing genetic relatedness among family ag-
nates and the cultural norm of revering family elders. 
Thus, the influences of genetic relatedness and genera-
tion on kinship status were causational, despite the use 
of correlation analysis methods invoked in this study. 
The results rejected the null hypothesis, which predicted 
that the Chinese kinship system was constructed based 
solely on genetic relatedness. Therefore, other factors 
such as generation, a cultural factor, might also play 
important roles. Clearly, the results were far more in-
triguing than I had expected. 
While both genetic relatedness and the generation 
factors had strong influences on the Chinese kinship 
system among male agnates, only genetic relatedness 
played a significant role in determining kinship status 
among female agnates. This was due to the social prac-
tice of females marrying out, mostly before 20 years old 
(Jiang, 1998), in patrilineal, patrilocal Chinese families. 
A short tenure in the family made it difficult for elder 
females to strongly influence younger female agnates. 
Among males, however, elder members had more time 
and opportunities to ascend to higher statues to be domi-
nant over younger members in the hierarchically struc-
tured family. Fig. 1 also shows that, for agnates with the 
same degrees of genetic relatedness, their kinship statuses 
were not entirely symmetrical with senior members 
sometimes ranked higher than junior members in the 
kinship system. This explains why generation and kinship 
were positively related. Clearly, by inflating the kinship 
status of senior members, the Chinese kinship system, 
while reflecting the traditional value of filial piety, ma-
nipulated the social cognitive system in favor of elders 
so as to facilitate the dominance of elders in the family 
(Sun, 2010). This was in conflict with the direction pre-
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dicted by kin selection. For instance, the “grandmother 
effect,” as seen in other human societies, would favor 
the younger and junior members, whose reproductive 
values are higher, rather than the older members in the 
family (e.g., Lahdenpera et al., 2004; Sear and Mace, 
2007). Therefore, the filial piety practice in dynastic 
China provided an even stronger argument for cultural 
involvement in the evolution of the Chinese family. 
From this point of view, hypotheses with the duel influ-
ence of genetics and culture (e.g., Richerson and Boyd, 
2005; Henrich and Henrich, 2007) appear to have a bet-
ter explanatory power than kin selection alone in the 
evolution of human social organization. 
A surprising finding in this study is that the kinship 
ranks (and thus, presumably social statuses in the family) 
of female agnates were almost symmetrical with their 
corresponding male members (Fig. 1 and Table 1), de-
spite the general perception that Chinese women were 
severely oppressed in traditional China. Obviously, the 
kinship factor seemed to be more important than the 
gender factor in determining social status in the family. 
That is to say, gender played a less important role than 
genetic relatedness and generation in social dominance 
in traditional Chinese families. 
The most important finding in this study, however, is 
that genetic relatedness was more important in deter-
mining kinship rank among collateral agnates, whereas, 
for lineal agnates, the cultural factor of generation 
played the major role (Table 1). The separation of the 
relative importance of genetic relatedness versus gen-
eration in determining kinship rank allows quantitative 
assessment on the importance of genetic and cultural 
factors beyond traditional verbal arguments, especially 
between natural and social scientists. The difference in 
the importance of the genetic and cultural factors be-
tween lineal and collateral kin demonstrates that nether 
factor worked as a constant, uniform, or global force on 
human social evolution in traditional Chinese society. 
Their strengths varied with bio-cultural contingencies 
within the family. 
The kinship system had a tremendous influence on 
dynastic Chinese criminal laws, which were character-
ized by filial piety and kinship (Goody, 1990). The cur-
rent study shows that the penalties were affected by both 
kinship rank and seniority in generation and age if the 
criminals and the victims were relatives. The cruelty of 
penalties and its relevancy to kinship status necessarily 
rendered dynastic Chinese criminal laws a strong kin 
selection force on inclusive fitness. This was most ex-
plicitly asserted in statutes against family violence, no-
tably battery, as we analyzed here. Although many other 
crimes, such as robbery and murder, were prosecuted 
similarly according to the same principle (Zhang, 1999), 
the data were less complete, for which they were ex-
cluded from analysis. 
Clearly, seniority provided an overpowering juris-
prudential guidance for who should be punished more 
severely. Kinship rank, though less important, deter-
mined penalty on a finer scale. Among close relatives, 
the discrepancy in punishment remained large. By su-
perimposing the importance of seniority on that of kin-
ship, dynastic Chinese laws preferentially protected the 
elder members of the core family (mostly composed of 
lineal kin). Excluding the core family, kinship rank (and 
thus the underlying genetic relatedness) was the most 
important factor in criminal justice. This result shows 
that kin selection was indeed an important selective 
force among collateral agnates. Nevertheless, since cor-
relation between kinship and penalty was not perfect, 
kin selection alone was unlikely to be responsible for 
the social evolution of the Chinese family. 
Besides genetic relatedness and generation, other 
unspecified bio-cultural factors accounted for a consid-
erable amount of the variance (Table 1), although I was 
unable to pinpoint them for the lack of further informa-
tion. In all cases, kinship rank was significantly influ-
enced by, yet not exactly congruent with, genetic relat-
edness. Hence, kin selection was unlikely to be the only 
force that had shaped the Chinese family. Indeed, sev-
eral other factors, including reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 
1971; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod, 1984; 
Nowak et al., 1995), indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 
1987; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a,b; Lotem et al., 
1999; Wedekind and Milinski, 2000; Leimar and 
Hammerstein, 2001), costly signaling (Zahavi, 1977; 
Zahavi, 1995; Gintis et al., 2001), altruistic punish-
ment (Fehr and Gachter, 2002),  competition among 
relatives (West et al., 2001; Mock, 2004), and gender 
segregation in the family (Zhang, 1999) can reduce or 
even cancel the efficacy of kin selection. Reciprocal 
altruism, in particular, appears to be a major reason 
why close relatives in humans are often perceived and 
treated disproportionately more altruistically than their 
genetic worth, in comparison with distant relatives 
(e.g., Hames, 1988; Burnstein et al., 1994; Barrett et 
al., 2002). These factors are expected to compromise 
the strength of kin selection. 
The results of this study were based on the Chinese 
kinship system as a socio-cultural institution per se but 
not on what people actually practiced, which varied 
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across geographical regions and historical times. Any 
discrepancy between the kinship system and social 
practice would certainly affect the results presented here 
regarding the strength of kin selection. Although exis-  
ting historical records, evidence, and signs indicate that 
this kinship system was closely and broadly followed in 
Chinese history, the exact degree of match between the 
social institution and social practice is probably un-
knowable, typical of studies using historical data. This 
situation may cast some uncertainty for the exact role 
played by kin selection in reality, but it is unlikely to 
significantly reduce, much less to eliminate, the impor-
tance of kin selection in the traditional patrilineal Chi-
nese family. Of course, the limited role of kin selection 
was also reflected in the obvious historical fact that the 
genetic relatedness in the maternal lineage, which was 
also subject to kin selection, was rarely considered. 
Same could be said for polygynous marriages, where 
genetic lineages through concubines were also excluded. 
These cultural practices, although their impact was un-
known, would necessarily weaken the strength of kin 
selection in Chinese society. 
In conclusion, this study has unveiled an unexpect-
edly complex picture about the role of kin selection in 
human social evolution as exemplified in traditional 
China. On the one hand, the positive relationship be-
tween kinship and genetic relatedness argues for the 
efficacy of kin selection via especially the criminal 
justice system in dynastic China. This provides a solid 
piece of evidence against arguments discrediting the 
importance of kin selection in humans (e.g., Sahlins, 
1976). On the other hand, it was also true that genetic 
relatedness could not alone determine the Chinese 
kinship system, which was affected by seniority and 
other bio-cultural factors as well. Furthermore, this 
study demonstrates that the strength of kin selection 
could vary between lineal and collateral relatives and 
culturally imposed institutions (such as seniority) 
could significantly weaken the strength of kin selection 
in humans. 
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